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Throwing New Flags: Should There Be Criminal Sanctions 
or a Better Chance of Civil Sanctions for Lawyers or 
Service Providers Who Breach Confidentiality? 
Lea L. Lach* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although it is fairly new and threatening to client confidentiality, “cloud 
computing” does not warrant extraordinary efforts to impose new sanctions for its 
adverse consequences. This change in the way that lawyers store and access client 
files is controllable even without an increase in criminal or civil penalties for 
breach of client confidentiality. The risks that cloud computing carries are not 
entirely new, and state bar associations’ attitudes toward the practice reflects that 
understanding.  
What seems more radical is the possibility of criminal penalties for lawyers 
who breach confidentiality. Criminal penalties can affect certain types of American 
lawyers and some foreign lawyers, but they are rare for American lawyers in 
general. Furthermore, the difficulty of proving criminal intent and the likelihood of 
lawyer resistance would probably undermine efforts to fine or imprison a wider 
range of lawyers for breach of confidentiality.  
It would also be difficult to hold online service providers† (“OSPs”) liable for 
negligence that enables a lawyer’s breach of confidentiality. Making OSPs more 
susceptible to civil penalties might be easier to imagine than increasing the chances 
of criminal penalties for lawyers. Federal law and OSPs’ own policies however, 
often provide a shield from civil penalties that lawyers and clients are in no 
position to change at this time. 
The following Article explains why cloud computing poses the risks to client 
confidentiality that it does and why Americans should not regard a greater 
likelihood of criminal or civil penalties as a solution. Part I provides an overview of 
cloud computing and its relationship to legal ethics. The overview of cloud 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2014; B.A., Political Science and 
History, University of Pittsburgh. 
† Online service providers are referred to as OSPs, Internet service providers, and service 
providers interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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computing first explains how the technology works and its advantages and 
disadvantages. The overview then describes the responses of several state bar 
associations to the ethical implications of cloud computing. Part II explains why 
lawyers should not face criminal sanctions for cloud-related breach of 
confidentiality. Part III explains why it is not feasible to increase the chances of 
provider liability. Part IV concludes by arguing that even though cloud computing 
introduces new concerns specific to client confidentiality, increased civil penalties 
and criminal sanctions are not required to manage those concerns.  
I. OVERVIEWS: CLOUD COMPUTING AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO LEGAL 
ETHICS 
A. Cloud Computing 101 
When someone engages in cloud computing, it is illusory for him to think that 
he and his inner circle have complete control of their data. People use websites like 
Google and Facebook1 through an entire “network of computers and servers that 
are publicly accessible over the Internet . . . .”2 Yet new stronger software and 
computer chips make it possible for devices anywhere in the world, to behave as 
just one computer would, even laptops and smartphones.3 When people store or 
share data, which they can do to a considerable extent using cloud computing, it 
falls under the management of third-party servers.4 Besides being under third-party 
control, these servers may be scattered geographically.5 Any server within a 
particular third party’s network can pick up the stored or shared data.6 The “server 
farms” also allow third parties to enable later access to stored data on a number of 
                                                          
1 Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning—Professional Ethics at the 
Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 171–72 (2011) (noting that use of Google 
or Facebook counts as “cloud computing”). 
2 Meghan C. Lewallen, Note, Cloud Computing: A Lawyer’s Ethical Duty to Act with Reasonable 
Care when Storing Client Confidences “In the Cloud,” 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2013). 
3 Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Pa. Bar Ass’n, Ethical Obligations for 
Attorneys Using Cloud Computing/Software as a Service While Fulfilling the Duties of Confidentiality 
and Preservation of Client Property: Formal Opinion 2011-200, THE PA. LAWYER, May/June 2012, at 
49, available at http://www.slaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/2011-200-Cloud-Computing.pdf 
[hereinafter Pa. Bar Ass’n]; Trope & Hughes, supra note 1, at 171. 
4 Lewallen, supra note 2. 
5 Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3. 
6 Lewallen, supra note 2. 
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different devices.7 Of course, the third parties’ role means that the data is accessible 
to them as well. 
Cloud computing certainly has advantages as well as disadvantages. Perhaps 
the most important overall advantage is the ability to access cloud-based services 
from a wide range of devices. A person could find a new piece of information 
almost as soon as it reaches her inbox and immediately tell her client.8 For 
businesses like law firms, cost reduction and storage space may be equally 
important.9 It might be less expensive to let third parties manage data than to link it 
to a specific office-based desktop or server.10 According to Meghan C. Lewallen, 
the lesser expense may have the particular advantage of, “giving smaller firms a 
more level playing field with competitive large firms.”11 Even if cloud computing 
indeed bears a lower price than its predecessors, it can still provide a great deal of 
storage space and easy access to stored data.12 Lawyers could even “engage in 
online document collaboration with clients and colleagues,” which allows for the 
receipt of feedback on a document while a lawyer is still in the process of 
completing that document.13 Document collaboration may further reduce costs 
because lawyers may become less likely to waste paper and ink on drafts they 
believe to be “final” before learning that more revisions are needed. Cloud 
computing can greatly enhance a firm’s work without automatically imposing a 
high financial price.  
The disadvantages may however, seem worse than just a high financial price. 
The involvement of third parties is itself a disadvantage14 because consumers 
cannot easily monitor those third parties for signs of abuses. Cloud service 
providers can be fairly secretive,15 and consumers must often choose between 
                                                          
7 Trope & Hughes, supra note 1, at 164. 
8 See Lewallen, supra note 2, at 1139 (stating that cloud computing enables “quick and efficient 
communication”); Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3 (stating that advantages of cloud computing include 
“quick, efficient communication” and “immediate access to updates”). 
9 Lewallen, supra note 2, at 1139. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.; Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3.  
13 Lewallen, supra note 2, at 1140. 
14 See Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes & Masooda N. Bashir, Information Privacy and Data 
Control in Cloud Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 341, 363 (2013); Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 49–50. 
15 See Trope & Hughes, supra note 1, at 174–75. 
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accepting unfavorable terms and conditions or rejecting the service.16 Yet the 
provider could alter a program or engage in “maintenance” duty in a way that limits 
access to the service for a while.17 This scenario is not favorable for a lawyer who 
needs to communicate with his client right away, such as a criminal lawyer whose 
client faces execution. In some cases, data may even vanish completely rather than 
temporarily. Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, cloud computing can 
easily undermine client confidentiality.  
B. Cloud Computing’s Relationship to Legal Ethics 
Cloud computing strongly challenges lawyers’ ability to carry out their duty 
of confidentiality. According to Rule 1.6(a) of the American Bar Association’s 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys “shall not reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, 
the disclosure is impliedly authorized . . . or the disclosure is permitted by 
paragraph (b).”18 Paragraph (b) of Rule 1.6 lays out several exceptions,19 but 
confidentiality is the general rule. Nearly all American jurisdictions have adopted 
the Model Rules.20 
Information that must stay confidential is vulnerable in the “cloud” because 
the very nature of cloud computing makes it hard to prevent unauthorized access. 
Lawyers essentially engage in “outsourcing” when they use cloud computing.21 
Lawyers allow a third-party service provider to manage information22 in return for 
upholding the provider’s terms and conditions.23 If the service provider is a large, 
for-profit company like Google, it may not be inclined to respect ethical rules that 
do not govern its own business. Even if this is not true, authority figures within a 
company may be incapable of monitoring every employee at all times. An 
employee might peruse confidential information and use it for a malicious purpose 
despite a company policy or prohibiting such conduct.24 This person is probably 
                                                          
16 See Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 53. 
17 Trope & Hughes, supra note 1, at 178. 
18 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1983). 
19 Id. at 1.6(b). 
20 See Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_
adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
21 Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 52. 
22 Lewallen, supra note 2. 
23 See Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 53. 
24 See Lewallen, supra note 2, at 1141. 
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someone whom the lawyer does not know, because a low-level employee probably 
would not be involved in the service agreement’s formation. In fact, there is a 
strong possibility that the employee is working in a distant country given that a 
company can set up servers throughout the world.25 Even worse, what he or she did 
might not violate that country’s laws.26 In fact, the lawyer may never see or know 
every person or server involved in the management of client information, and 
agreements often do not allow for much advance negotiation.27 
Even though many state bar associations permit the use of cloud services, 
lawyers may not use the unintentional release of confidential information as a 
defense. For example, a Pennsylvania ethics opinion states that storing confidential 
client data “in the cloud” is fine if a lawyer acts reasonably to preserve the data’s 
confidentiality and uses “reasonable safeguards . . . to ensure that the data is 
protected from breaches . . . and other risks.”28 The opinion gives numerous 
suggestions for meeting these conditions, from firewall installation to negotiation 
of lawyer-friendly terms with service providers.29 At the same time, it notes that 
carelessness may violate more than just Pennsylvania’s version of Model Rule 
1.6.30  
Ensuring confidentiality is also necessary for a lawyer to be truly “competent” 
under Pennsylvania’s Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.1.31 Rule 
1.15 of these Rules demands safeguarding of a client’s property, which can include 
electronic files.32 Given these suggestions and the conditions they reflect, a lawyer 
would clearly bear some responsibility for even a third party’s improper use or 
exposure of data.  
A similar attitude is present among the bar associations of states other than 
Pennsylvania. An informal Ohio ethics opinion allows for cloud computing but 
cites the same kinds of ethics rules as the Pennsylvania ethics opinion and calls on 
                                                          
25 Lewallen, supra note 2; Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3. 
26 Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 50. 
27 See id. at 53. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 52–53. 
30 Id. at 50 (noting that Pennsylvania has a version of ABA Model Rule 1.6). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
  
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XIV – Spring 2014 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2014.147 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
320 
lawyers to take steps to keep data confidential.33 A New Jersey ethics opinion 
avoids the term “cloud” and speaks instead of “an electronic filing system” in 
which files “are scanned into a digitized format such as Portable Data Format 
(“PDF”).”34 A lawyer could retrieve these files almost anywhere he goes,35 but the 
opinion states that digitizing them would be fine if he uses “reasonable affirmative 
steps to guard against the risk of inadvertent disclosure.”36 In nearby New York, 
the state bar association calls for “reasonable care” while permitting storage of 
client files in the cloud, and explains what lawyers can do to ensure that service 
providers respect their obligations.37 A Massachusetts ethics opinion also stresses 
confidentiality and the role of service providers while taking the same overall 
position as the New York opinion.38 In general, these opinions do not mandate 
particular methods of preventing breach of confidentiality but instead allow for 
cloud computing when there is some action to prevent breach.39 Ultimately, 
however the exact nature of the preventative action is a matter of discretion for 
lawyers. 
The fact that lawyers have discretion in determining the measure of protection 
against a breach raises questions about the appropriateness of the usual sanctions 
for breach of confidentiality. When lawyers allow third parties to handle large 
amounts of data, they are taking a serious risk. It is hard to oversee a third party’s 
use or abuse of data, especially if the data exists on a server in a foreign country.40 
Regardless of the risks, lawyers have strong incentives to use cloud computing 
anyway because it is quick and fairly inexpensive. The combined seriousness of the 
risks and likelihood that lawyers will still use the cloud may indicate a need for 
more stringent deterrents to breach of confidentiality. 
                                                          
33 Professionalism Comm., Ohio State Bar Ass’n, OSBA Informal Advisory Opinion 2013-03, 
OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N (July 25, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/LegalTools/ 
Documents/OSBAInfAdvOp2013-03.pdf. 
34 Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Electronic Storage and Access of Client Files, N.J. COURTS, 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ethics/ACPE_Opinion701_ElectronicStorage_12022005.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Ethics Opinion 842, NEW YORK STATE BAR 
ASSOCIATION (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=1499. 
38 Ethics Opinions: Opinion 12-03, MASS. BAR ASS’N (May 17, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www 
.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/2010-2019/2012/opinion-12-03. 
39 See Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 34; N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l 
Ethics, supra note 37; Professionalism Comm., Ohio State Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
40 Lewallen, supra note 2; Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3. 
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II. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR LAWYERS WHO BREACH 
CONFIDENTIALITY THROUGH CLOUD COMPUTING 
A. Current Available Sanctions in the United States and Abroad 
Typical sanctions for lawyers who breach confidentiality threaten a lawyer’s 
reputation and pocketbook but hardly threaten his freedom. In Massachusetts,41 
New Jersey,42 New York,43 Ohio,44 and Pennsylvania,45 the highest state court or 
appeals court, along with a special court or committee devoted to legal ethics, is 
responsible for disciplining lawyers. Examples of sanctions that one of these bodies 
may impose include disbarment, suspension from practice, censure, or 
reprimands.46 Even though these types of sanctions are not criminal sanctions, or 
even really civil sanctions, sanctions such as disbarment or suspension deny 
lawyers the freedom to practice the profession of their choice. It is important to 
note however, that not all lawyers face either of these sanctions for ethics 
violations. Furthermore, if the sanction results in a mere reprimand, the lawyer may 
lose clients or respect but still technically be free to practice law.  
While sanctions are also available outside of a state’s ethical discipline 
system, they do not always accompany ethical discipline and do not involve 
imprisonment of a lawyer in any case. There is discussion about the victims of a 
confidentiality breach possibly filing lawsuits based on legal malpractice or breach 
of fiduciary duty,47 or on the tort of breach of confidence.48 This is a client’s 
choice, however. It will not necessarily accompany ethical proceedings.49 
Furthermore, these lawsuits are all civil claims. A client could for example receive 
money damages from a lawyer, but the lawyer will not go to jail no matter how 
egregious the breach. 
                                                          
41 Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of Process and 
Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 258–59 (2011). 
42 Id. at 280–82. 
43 Id. at 286–88. 
44 Id. at 293–94. 
45 Id. at 298–99. 
46 Id. 
47 Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities and Liabilities in Negotiations, 
22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 249, 262 (2009).  
48 Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 673–74 (2012). 
49 Richmond, supra note 47. 
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There is at least one federal statute providing for criminal sanctions against 
lawyers who misuse private information. As Stacey A. Tovino notes, this 
development actually came later than the original statute.50 In 1996, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) left it to either a separate 
statute or the Department of Health and Human Services to enact privacy rules for 
health care information.51 The Department issued a “Privacy Rule” in the early 
2000s.52 The rule first applied to health care plans and clearinghouses as well as 
certain health care providers, and it limited their use and disclosure of certain 
health care-related information on individuals.53 Even though there was no direct 
impact on lawyers who had to access such information to effectively represent a 
doctor or hospital, as in a malpractice case,54 the Rule required that covered entities 
clearly ensure that outside lawyers and other “business associates” kept the 
information confidential.55 
In 2009, direct regulation finally arrived and opened lawyers to penalties 
already possible for plans and providers, including criminal sanctions.56 The direct 
regulation was part of the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act (“HITECH”).57 Section 13404(a) of HITECH expressly forbids 
“a business associate of a covered entity” to “use and disclose . . . protected health 
information” under most circumstances.58 HITECH goes on to say, in § 13404(c), 
that civil and criminal penalties can cover business associates.59 Since the Privacy 
Rule’s definition of “business associate” includes lawyers,60 lawyers are among 
those who could face criminal penalties if they do not obey § 13404(a) and 
companion provision § 13404(b).61 A lawyer faces these penalties if she engages in 
                                                          
50 Stacey A. Tovino, Gone Too Far: Federal Regulation of Health Care Attorneys, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 813, 814–15 (2013). 
51 Id. at 816–17. 
52 Id. at 817. 
53 Id. at 819. 
54 Id. at 822–23, 825. 
55 Id. at 823–25. 
56 Tovino, supra note 50, at 823–25. 
57 Id. at 814–15, 826. 
58 42 U.S.C. § 17934(a) (2012). 
59 Id. 
60 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(1)(ii) (2013). 
61 42 U.S.C. § 17934(c) (2012). 
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knowing and wrongful disclosure, obtainment or use of protected information.62 
Fines and imprisonment are possible, and a prison term could last one year, five 
years, or ten years depending on the circumstances of the crime.63 The Act does not 
cover a wide range of lawyers, but it is significant just for subjecting lawyers to the 
risk of fines and imprisonment for misuse of private information.  
Foreign law also provides a model for using the criminal law to punish 
lawyers’ failure to uphold confidentiality standards. For example, France’s criminal 
code provides for a fine and a year of imprisonment for “disclosure of secret 
information by a person entrusted with such a secret . . . because of his position or 
profession . . . .”64 At least one legal commentator presents this provision as one 
that would apply to lawyers.65 He also notes a provision of Germany’s criminal 
code that can subject lawyers to fines or imprisonment if they do not safeguard 
confidential information.66 A German lawyer who “unlawfully discloses a secret of 
another . . . which belongs to the sphere of personal privacy or a business or trade 
secret . . . confided to or otherwise made known to him in his capacity as . . . 
attorney” could pay a fine or spend up to a year behind bars.67 The European laws 
do not use the words “confidentiality” or “confidential,”68 but they still threaten 
lawyers with criminal penalties for certain disclosures of information they receive 
through their work.  
Foreign law and HITECH demonstrate how states could punish lawyers for 
confidentiality breaches under criminal law, but it is important to remember that 
these laws do not cover a wide range of U.S. lawyers. Foreign law will not apply to 
Americans who work almost exclusively in the United States. Additionally, the 
German and French laws are part of codes that cover entire countries, while the 
U.S. generally leaves lawyer discipline to each of the individual states. HITECH is 
a federal law and applies to American lawyers, but the lawyers must work with 
                                                          
62 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2012). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b) (2012). 
64 CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 226-13 (Fr.), available at http://www.legislationline.org/ 
documents/section/criminal-codes. 
65 David L. Nersessian, How Legislative Bans on Foreign and International Law Obstruct the 
Practice and Regulation of American Lawyers, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1647, 1673 n.127 (2012). 
66 Id. 
67 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I 
[BGBL. I] 3322, as amended, § 203 (Ger), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ 
stgb/englisch_stgb.html.  
68 Id.; CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 226-13 (Fr.). 
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health care-related information and represent certain health care-related entities.69 
Using statutes that cover few or no U.S. lawyers as bases for statutes that cover 
nearly all U.S. lawyers and confidentiality breaches may lead to enforcement 
difficulties. What might work well against foreign lawyers or small groups of 
lawyers and breaches will not necessarily work well against U.S. lawyers and 
breaches in general. Persons involved in state law enforcement would have to keep 
a closer watch on far more lawyers than HITECH covers, and it may be harder to 
catch every breach when the group of lawyers theoretically subject to a statute is 
broad.  
Even if states could easily identify breaches when they occur, the range of 
lawyers who could experience criminal sanctions may be small in reality. As 
common criminal law and statutory criminal law in the U.S. tend to attach a mens 
rea element to crimes,70 a defendant generally must have some idea that his 
conduct is unlawful.71 There are “strict liability” statutes that do not call for a mens 
rea, but the number is fairly small and the statutes tend to focus on “potentially 
harmful or injurious items” like grenades.72 However, proving that a lawyer 
breached confidentiality with a particular mens rea, such as “purposely” or 
“knowingly,”73 may be difficult if he committed the breach through cloud 
computing. The lawyer may understand the general risks but still fail to realize that 
a particular action can or will result in breach. Furthermore, some serious breaches 
could result from omissions, such as failure to install a strong firewall, rather than 
actions. A criminal statute would have to name specific actions or omissions in 
cloud computing that can or will result in breach, which may take a great deal of 
the state legislature’s time and still not cover all serious risks.  
The statute could call for a “recklessly” or “negligently” mens rea if many 
actions and omissions seem more like civil negligence than criminal acts. If the 
state has adopted the Model Penal Code’s definitions of recklessness or negligence, 
though, many lawyers and breaches may still fall short of the standards for 
criminally reckless or negligent conduct. Recklessness under the Code “involves a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would 
observe in the actor’s situation.”74 Negligence “involves a gross deviation from the 
                                                          
69 Tovino, supra note 50, at 843–44. 
70 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–06 (1994). 
71 Id. at 606–07. 
72 Id. at 606–08. 
73 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).  
74 Id. 
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standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”75 
A breach of confidentiality that warrants civil liability may not be sufficiently 
“gross” to warrant criminal sanctions.  
Regardless of the required mens rea, lawyers may express strong resistance to 
criminal sanctions for what were traditionally legal ethics violations. Lawyers are 
not accustomed to any criminal sanctions as a response to breach of client 
confidentiality. Disciplinary action under legal ethics rules is also not the only 
punishment that a lawyer may receive. Civil sanctions like monetary damages are 
also available. Many lawyers may legitimately perceive criminal sanctions as 
excessive and unnecessary, which could greatly undermine their potential to deter 
breaches of confidentiality.  
There are also legitimate reasons to trust state bar associations to deter 
breaches that may occur through cloud computing. The mere fact that bar 
associations are letting members use the cloud suggests that they find breaches of 
confidentiality preventable. They are also describing many strategies for preventing 
breach in their ethics opinions. For example, the Pennsylvania Bar Association’s 
Formal Opinion spreads breach prevention strategies across two pages,76 and the 
Ohio State Bar Association’s Informal Advisory Opinion (“OSBA”) spreads 
strategies across four pages.77 
Additionally, not every risk and concern that cloud computing implicates is 
unique to cloud computing. As the New Jersey opinion on “Electronic Storage And 
Access of Client Files” says, many lawyers “use messengers, delivery services, 
document warehouses, or other outside vendors” not involved in the cloud.78 When 
a lawyer chooses these traditional vendors, “physical custody of client sensitive 
documents is entrusted to them. . .”79 The Pennsylvania Bar Association likens 
cloud computing to “an online form of outsourcing subject to Rule 5.1 and Rule 5.3 
governing the supervision of those who are associated with an attorney.”80 The 
Pennsylvania Bar Association, too, acknowledges that lawyers had ways to leave 
client data with outsiders in earlier times. At the same time, it explicitly indicates 
that the same ethics rules can cover cloud computing and the older means of 
outside storage alike. The Ohio State Bar Association is even more forthright in 
                                                          
75 Id. 
76 Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 52–53. 
77 Professionalism Comm., Ohio State Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
78 Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 34. 
79 Id. 
80 Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 52 (emphasis added). 
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acknowledging that the cloud presents problems that are not so new by claiming 
that “issues and ethical duties regarding cloud storage are analogous to the ones 
that apply when lawyers opt to use a vendor to store their paper files offsite. . .”81 If 
there are some similarities between cloud computing and earlier means of storing 
files, state bar associations are probably well-prepared for breach-of-confidentiality 
claims involving the cloud.  
In that case, new criminal penalties hardly seem necessary to deter breaches 
and ensure that lawyers face some kind of discipline for breaches. Bar associations 
are aware of the risks of cloud computing, and persons in charge of disciplining 
their lawyer peers do not intend to be more lenient than they would be if the breach 
resulted from offsite paper storage. The threats of earlier data storage methods to 
confidentiality also did not make lawyers more vulnerable to criminal penalties. 
There was no change in the criminal law to make lawyers more vulnerable to its 
reach, at least outside the narrow context of health care. Yet threats of civil or 
professional penalties undoubtedly motivated some lawyers to be more careful 
about avoiding breach of confidentiality. If cloud computing and earlier storage 
methods are somewhat analogous, there is reason to hope that deterrence through 
current civil and professional penalties will remain effective.  
III. BETTER CHANCE OF CIVIL PENALTIES FOR ONLINE SERVICE 
PROVIDERS THAT ENABLE BREACH 
One alternative to more stringent penalties for lawyers is a greater likelihood 
of civil liability for companies providing cloud-computing services, such as 
Google, Facebook, and YouTube.82 There are already some contexts where one 
person’s tort can lead to liability for another person or for a larger entity.83 For 
example, even when an employee directly commits a tort, the employer may still 
face liability for that tort.84 Such indirect liability can be appropriate when a breach 
takes place. The actual breach may be the lawyer’s work, but perhaps it would be 
much harder or impossible to commit the breach without a certain action or 
omission of the service provider. Perhaps the risk of this breach was clear to the 
company, but the company failed to take any steps to reduce the risk even though 
certain steps were feasible. Lawyers still merit punishment for breach of their 
                                                          
81 Professionalism Comm., Ohio State Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
82 Trope & Hughes, supra note 1, at 171–72. 
83 Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 221, 222–23, 228 (2006). 
84 Id. at 228. 
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clients’ confidentiality, but the responsibility may not always fall on lawyers alone. 
Efforts to deter breach in the cloud may not be complete unless service providers 
face a greater likelihood of penalties for negligence that enables a breach.  
There are however, two important factors, which make it very difficult for 
lawyers and clients to hold the companies liable at this time.  
A. Federal Law 
Federal law grants service providers some protection against liability for torts 
like negligence. Under one statute, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”85 This provision shields 
Internet service providers from liability when potentially tortious content comes 
from a third party.86 In fact, “[c]ourts have flatly refused to strip . . . immunity even 
when the ISP has an active role in creating or distributing the content.”87 If a 
lawyer uses the provider’s services to post confidential client data and the client 
sues both lawyer and provider, it may be dispositive that the lawyer posted the 
information. Given courts’ broad reading of the federal law, the provider could 
escape liability even if it negligently designed its service or neglected to block or 
punish conduct that violates its terms of use.  
Some courts have denied complete immunity to service providers in the past 
few years, but this is not true of all federal circuits and does not affect most passive 
providers.88 Elizabeth M. Jaffe, an Associate Professor at John Marshall Law 
School in Atlanta, explores the denial of complete immunity in a Hastings 
Communications & Entertainment Law Journal article published in 2012.89 One 
opinion that she cites in her article is a federal district court opinion that indicates 
that complete immunity may not apply when providers “are encouraging and 
soliciting wrongful content from third parties or creating such content.”90 Jaffe then 
notes that several federal appellate courts may similarly deny that a provider has 
complete immunity in some cases.91 As support for this assertion, Jaffe names just 
                                                          
85 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
86 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 
368 (2005). 
87 Id. at 370. 
88 Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Imposing a Duty in an Online World: Holding the Web Host Liable for 
Cyberbullying, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 277, 286, 289 (2013). 
89 See id. 
90 Id. at 286. 
91 Id. at 289. 
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four appellate courts and notes that two others may still find complete immunity.92 
Whether victims of a breach of confidentiality have any chance to hold a provider 
liable seems to depend at least in part on where they live. Additionally, the 
appellate court opinions that Jaffe cites to support her point involved providers that 
did more than just publish controversial content.93 These opinions would not aid 
victims of a breach who merely claim that the provider was negligent in designing 
a site or enforcing its terms and conditions. Omissions alone likely remain 
insufficient to enable liability for providers. The development reported is 
encouraging but does not mean that change in the law is unnecessary to increase a 
provider’s chance of liability. 
Chances are that the will to change the law does not exist in Congress right 
now. This is evidenced by the fact that the Communications Decency Act’s 
immunity provision has survived for nearly twenty years, ever since the law’s 
passage in 1996.94 It is unlikely that many members of Congress would be inclined 
to try amending a long-standing statute when Congress cannot even pass a lot of 
new legislation.95 Even in a more active Congress, members may be reluctant to 
disturb service providers’ fairly solid reliance on federal immunity from negligence 
liability. Reliance is an important consideration because the current law is clear 
about what providers may do or allow without fear of liability. Altering the law 
may make it harder for companies to figure out when and whether they would be 
liable for third-party conduct, especially if active participation in the conduct is not 
necessary. Of course, service providers could probably count on Congress to 
respect their reliance because of their wealth, lobbying ability, and importance in 
American life. Under these circumstances, clients cannot count on Congress to 
limit Communications Decency Act immunity within the next few years.  
B. Online Service Providers’ Terms and Conditions 
Service providers themselves may also restrict a lawyer’s ability to hold them 
liable for negligence, as well as the lawyer’s freedom to reject the restriction. In 
addition to the technology that enables lawyers to breach client confidentiality, 
cloud service providers like Google and Dropbox present lawyers with “Terms of 
                                                          
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 290–92. 
94 Id. at 339 (noting that the law providing immunity from liability for third-party postings is the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996). 
95 ‘Do-Nothing’ Congress on Track for One of the Least Productive Years Ever, NBC NEWS 
(Feb. 3, 2013, 7:37 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/do-nothing-congress-track-
one-least-productive-years-ever-v21578861. 
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Service.”96 These “Terms of Service” explain what the user and the service 
provider may and may not do in relation to the service provided.97 One likely 
condition is limitation of the provider’s liability.98 
Acceptance of the limitation frees providers from most, if not all, 
responsibility that they might otherwise bear for losses such as data or profit 
losses.99 Persons and entities closely connected to the company may also enjoy 
protection, including suppliers,100 distributors,101 and employees.102 It may be 
irrelevant whether a person would be claiming punitive damages, consequential 
damages, or exemplary damages.103 The same may be true of the overall “legal 
theory” that the person, if allowed to do so, may wish to use in court.104 Google’s 
terms and conditions even include a provision on “Business uses of our 
Services”105 that is especially relevant to private law firms. This provision imposes 
a promise on businesses to “hold harmless and indemnify Google . . . from any 
claim, suit or action arising from or related to the use of the Services. . .”106 There 
are states that prohibit these kinds of limitations from being effective in practice,107 
but certainly not all states. A person or business that refuses to accept the limitation 
will likely be unable to use the service, because the terms and conditions of these 
agreements tend to be adhesive.108 Lawyers who directly defy the terms could be 
charged with unauthorized access to the services under federal law.109 If lawyers 
find that the terms do not go far enough to ensure protection of confidential data, 
                                                          
96 See, e.g., Policies & Principles: Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
intl/en/policies/terms/ (last modified Nov. 11, 2013); Dropbox Terms of Service, DROPBOX, https://www 
.dropbox.com/terms (last updated Mar. 26, 2012). 
97 GOOGLE, supra note 96; DROPBOX, supra note 96. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 GOOGLE, supra note 96; DROPBOX, supra note 96. 
104 Id. 
105 GOOGLE, supra note 96. 
106 Id. 
107 DROPBOX, supra note 96. 
108 Kesan et al., supra note 14, at 424; Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 53. 
109 Kesan et al., supra note 14, at 422. 
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then they must forgo the service in the first place. Of course, their options for data 
storage may be very limited if most storage systems involve cloud computing.  
The Pennsylvania Bar Association suggests that lawyers may soon gain more 
freedom to negotiate better terms, but bar associations do not regard this freedom 
as a current reality. The Pennsylvania Bar Association notes, “new competition in 
the cloud computing field is now causing vendors to consider altering terms.”110 It 
then suggests that this development may make it easier for lawyers to negotiate 
terms that better protect confidentiality.111 However, the use of “consider” to 
describe service providers’ attitude towards changing their terms suggests that most 
providers are only weighing the possibility of change right now. The Pennsylvania 
Bar Association offers no example of an actual change in terms that improves their 
compatibility with lawyers’ duties. The New York State Bar Association says that 
lawyers can protect confidentiality by making sure that service providers accept an 
obligation to do the same and that there is a way to enforce it.112 Lawyers would 
not necessarily have to convince a provider to change its written terms and 
conditions, because the New York State Bar Association’s statement may simply 
mean that lawyers must be sure existing terms and conditions establish the 
obligation and a means of enforcement. Similarly, while the Ohio State Bar 
Association urges lawyers to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the vendor’s 
conduct is compatible with . . . professional obligations,”113 it does not say that they 
should negotiate more lawyer-friendly terms. It simply adds that “the lawyer must 
exercise due diligence in ascertaining whether the vendor will be capable of 
conduct consistent with the lawyer’s own obligations.”114 The way this phrase is 
written, a lawyer could satisfy the obligation by examining a provider’s terms and 
refusing to use the provider’s services if the terms make him uneasy. The text does 
not imply that a lawyer can only satisfy the obligation by asking the provider for a 
change in terms that better suits the lawyer’s duties. Bar associations likely avoid 
mentioning this possibility because their members are aware that it is not really a 
current option. There is some hope that it will be a real option, but providers are 
just starting to move in that direction now.  
The opinions also make it clear that lawyers can exercise some control over 
the effects that a cloud service provider may have on confidentiality. The advice 
                                                          
110 Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 53. 
111 Id. 
112 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 37. 
113 Professionalism Comm., Ohio State Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
114 Id. 
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from the New York and Ohio bar associations mentioned above can help lawyers 
prevent a breach from happening in the first place.115 If they screen a provider’s 
terms for compatibility with their duties and choose only services with the most 
compatible terms,116 they are still making decisions that reduce the chances of a 
breach. The Pennsylvania Bar Association lists many examples of cloud service 
features and terms and conditions that lawyers should look for.117 Some of these 
include a way for providers to keep data from persons with no need to see it; a way 
for lawyers to retrieve data if they give up the service; and terms and conditions 
allowing law firms to audit security features.118 If a service and related terms have 
many features like these, persons working for the service provider probably intend 
to be vigilant about confidentiality. The features and terms reflect a conscious 
awareness of how easily cloud service can undermine confidentiality. The chances 
of negligent service design are probably lower in that case. It should also be easier 
to trust the provider to avoid negligent acts or omissions in a situation that could 
lead to breach, such as emergence of a virus.119 If a lawyer follows bar association 
suggestions when choosing a provider, then he should end up with a provider that 
does not negligently disregard the lawyer’s obligations. The difficulty of imposing 
civil penalties on providers may not matter because responsibility for breach is less 
likely to lie with the provider.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cloud computing is a new danger to client confidentiality, but not a reason to 
expand the sanctions available to lawyers and online service providers who breach 
confidentiality. It is certainly disturbing to imagine a lawyer or provider granting 
an unseen third party access to a Pittsburgh client’s files in another state or country. 
The client would likely assume that even her friends and family in Pittsburgh will 
never see the files, yet careless cloud computing may allow total strangers to see 
them. Even worse, in this scenario, the lawyer at least implicitly promised to keep 
the files confidential because his state ethics code requires it.  
This scenario could easily arouse calls for criminal sanctions against lawyers 
or a better chance of civil sanctions for service providers, but neither option is 
                                                          
115 See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 37; Professionalism Comm., 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
116 See Professionalism Comm., Ohio State Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
117 Pa. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 52–53. 
118 Id. 
119 Trope & Hughes, supra note 1, at 183. 
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practical right now. With the exception of the HITECH Act that covers only some 
lawyers,120 American law does not provide for criminal sanctions when lawyers 
breach client confidentiality. Even if it did, proving criminal intent may be 
challenging when many breaches would likely resemble civil negligence more than 
criminal acts. Meanwhile, raising the risk of civil sanctions for cloud service 
providers is nearly impossible because federal law121 and their own terms and 
conditions122 would likely shield them from liability. For the time being, clients 
must trust state bar associations to help lawyers prevent breach of confidentiality in 
the cloud and to impose sanctions for it. Fortunately, bar associations seem well 
prepared to do so in light of their experience with earlier storage methods that 
posed a threat to confidentiality.123 
Trust remains important in the lawyer-client relationship no matter how much 
technology might change. Even though it may be harder to trust lawyers to protect 
confidential information today, it is reasonable to believe that their bar associations 
can meet that challenge without new sanctions for breach of confidentiality. 
                                                          
120 Tovino, supra note 50, at 830–31. 
121 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
122 GOOGLE, supra note 96; DROPBOX, supra note 96. 
123 E.g., Professionalism Comm., Ohio State Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
